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WHAT HAPPENS TO A DREAM DEFERRED?1: 
CLEANSING THE TAINT OF  
SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT  
SCHOOL DISTRICT V. RODRIGUEZ 
IAN MILLHISER 
INTRODUCTION 
Half a century ago, the Supreme Court recognized the crucial 
role of public education in opening the doors of opportunity to all 
Americans.2 In its famous decision declaring school segregation 
unconstitutional, the Court proclaimed that “it is doubtful that any 
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education,”3 and yet that same Court, repopulated 
by the fruits of President Richard Nixon’s “Southern Strategy,”4 
turned its back on education just nineteen years later.5 
 
Copyright © 2005 by Ian Millhiser. 
 1. Langston Hughes, Harlem (Montage of a Dream Deferred), in THE COLLECTED POEMS 
OF LANGSTON HUGHES 426 (Arnold Rampersad & David Roessel eds., Alfred A. Knopf 1994) 
(1951). 
 2. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is . . . . a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. The “Southern Strategy” refers to a Republican campaign strategy to appeal to 
conservative white voters through a thinly veiled message of anti-black racism. Angela P. 
Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1923, 2000 (2000). 
For an insider’s view of President Nixon’s battle to stack the Court with opponents of civil 
rights, see generally JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE (2001). One of then-Assistant 
Attorney General William Rehnquist’s first assignments at the Department of Justice was to 
provide legal advice to the White House’s successful campaign to intimidate liberal Justice Abe 
Fortas into retirement. Id. at 4–12. In replacing Fortas and other departing Justices, Nixon 
actively sought “strict constructionist” judges, described by Rehnquist as those who “will 
generally not be favorably inclined toward claims of either criminal defendants or civil rights 
plaintiffs.” Id. at 16. 
 5. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (refusing to recognize 
a fundamental right to education). All four of President Nixon’s appointees, Chief Justice 
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In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,6 the 
Court upheld a public education funding system in Texas that 
provided fewer funds per student in poorer school districts than in 
wealthier ones.7 In reaching this decision, the Court announced a two-
part holding: first, that poverty is not a suspect class entitled to strict 
scrutiny in discrimination cases,8 and second, that education is not a 
fundamental right for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.9 
Rodriguez is significant for its devastating impact on low income 
children, but it is equally significant because of the philosophical shift 
it marked in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
The Rodriguez decision foreshadowed a turning point in 
American law. Prior to this decision, the Warren-era Justices were 
willing to cure social injustices poorly addressed by the political 
branches through broad equitable relief. With four Nixon-appointed 
Justices, however, the Court not only began to defer to the legislature 
but also began to view its role as increasingly limited, even when it 
conceded that a constitutional violation had occurred. As this Note 
will discuss, this trend was exacerbated as Justices appointed by 
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush came to dominate 
the Court. 
This Note has two purposes. First, it offers a progressive 
constitutional framework that includes a fundamental, affirmative 
right to an adequate education. Second—and just as significantly—it 
explains why the conservative doctrine of “judicial restraint” leaves 
undereducated Americans without recourse to any branch of 
government. This Note will argue that judicial deference to state 
legislatures is inappropriate when such deference necessarily results 
in continued constitutional violations. 
Part I argues that the legislative branch is structurally unfit to 
provide educational civil rights and asserts that an affirmative right to 
an adequate education can only come from the courts. Part II 
considers the judiciary’s ability to provide a meaningful remedy in 
educational civil rights cases. Part II concludes that the ‘Far Right’s 
 
Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun, voted to deny relief in Rodriguez. Of the 
pre-Nixon members of the Court, only Justice Stewart joined the majority. 
 6. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 7. Id. at 58–59. 
 8. Id. at 29. 
 9. See id. at 35 (“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection 
under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so 
protected.”). 
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cries for “judicial self-restraint”10 should be ignored when such 
restraint allows continuing constitutional violations to occur. Part III 
constructs a progressive method of constitutional interpretation that 
allows the courts to meet a changing society with appropriately 
expanded rights, while at the same time providing a limiting principle 
to prevent judges from injecting their personal opinions into the law. 
Under this method, an affirmative constitutional duty is imposed on 
the states whenever that duty is necessary to preserve a preexisting 
constitutional right. Part IV examines the constitutional right to vote 
and argues that a baseline education is necessary to uphold this 
preexisting right. Finally, Part V proposes seeking guidance from 
state curricula and assessments in defining the scope of a fundamental 
right to an adequate education. 
I.  THE NEED FOR A JUDICIAL REMEDY 
The central insight of Rodriguez is that “the Justices of this 
Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems 
so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the 
raising and disposition of public revenues.”11 Such a presumption of 
judicial incompetence is not to be abandoned lightly, lest the Court 
relive the shameful history of Lochner v. New York.12 But Lochner’s 
folly was not “judicial activism,” as so many conservative revisionists 
assert.13 Lochner’s folly, in the words of the decision that ended its 
reign, was allowing the “exploitation of a class . . . who are in an 
unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus 
relatively defenseless . . . .”14 Under Lochner, the weakest Americans 
were left without a single branch of government from which to seek 
redress. The judiciary was quite clearly their enemy, and the 
 
 10. John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1221 
(1993). 
 11. 411 U.S. at 41. 
 12. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner held that labor protections such as maximum hour laws 
were subject to the highest level of constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 56. This opinion is now almost 
universally viewed as “unprincipled judicial overreaching” into an area beyond the judiciary’s 
competence. Neal Devins, The Interactive Constitution: An Essay on Clothing Emperors and 
Searching for Constitutional Truth, 85 GEO. L.J. 691, 693 (1997). 
 13. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874–76 (1978) 
(criticizing Lochner not for “activism” but instead for forbidding the legislature to alter the 
“existing distribution of wealth and entitlements”). 
 14. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937); see also Sunstein, supra note 
13, at 876 (quoting same). 
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majoritarian branches were forbidden from acting by that very 
enemy. 
No system of government is legitimate that leaves a class of 
citizens unable “to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”15 This right to seek such redress is among the protected 
privileges and immunities long recognized by the Supreme Court,16 
and yet by reserving to the legislature what properly belongs to the 
judiciary, the Court since Rodriguez has denied underprivileged 
Americans their most basic right to seek redress. If the right to seek 
redress is truly a fundamental constitutional right, then every 
American must be able to seek relief in some branch of government. 
Accordingly, if legislatures are structurally incapable of providing 
meaningful relief, then another branch must possess the power to act. 
This is not to say, of course, that the judiciary must grant relief in 
areas in which the legislature cannot act, merely that it is improper 
for the judiciary to plead institutional incompetence in an area in 
which the elected braches are even less competent. 
As this Part argues, legislatures are structurally incapable of 
providing an adequate education to the millions of Americans kept in 
ignorance by underfunded school districts. Section A explains why 
local legislatures are ill-suited to provide relief to the poor and 
undereducated. Section B then explores the proper role of the courts 
in the face of a reluctant state legislature. 
It is also important to note what this Part will not discuss. 
Although this Note does argue that a fundamental right to an 
adequate education is implicit in the Due Process Clause, that 
discussion will be deferred until Parts III and IV. This first Part is 
concerned with a far narrower point: deference to the legislature, in 
and of itself, is insufficient reason to deny a constitutional right. As an 
alternative theory, this Part will propose that judicial deference 
should be the rule when the political process can effectively provide 
relief to aggrieved citizens, but that when the legislature is 
structurally unable to provide such relief, deference for its own sake is 
inappropriate. 
 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 16. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (listing, as among the 
“Privileges and Immunities” of citizenship, the rights “‘to come to the seat of government to 
assert any claim . . . upon that government, to transact any business . . . with it, [and] to seek its 
protection’”) (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867)). 
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A. Local Funding and the Wrongness of Rodriguez 
The Fourteenth Amendment plays a special role in ensuring the 
integrity of the political process. The Equal Protection Clause has 
long been understood to protect “discrete and insular minorities” 
against the vagaries of the political process.17 Similarly, both the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses have long been 
interpreted to forbid laws passed “without reference to [some 
independent] considerations in the public interest.”18 The mere fact 
that a law is blessed by the majoritarian process is never sufficient to 
render that law constitutional.19 
Conservatives have long claimed that a broad interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is a judicial subversion of the democratic 
process.20 But even the (conservative) Rodriguez Court conceded that 
the judiciary has a special role in protecting those “relegated to such a 
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process.”21 The Fourteenth 
Amendment is intended not to subvert, but to bolster, the democratic 
process against governmental structures that “curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities . . . .”22 As Professor Bruce Ackerman explains, Lochner 
was illegitimate because it protected those who “enjoyed ample 
opportunity to safeguard their own interests through the political 
 
 17. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 18. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973); see also Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (forbidding laws that exist for the sole purpose of harming a particular 
group). 
 19. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 50 
(1985) (“In no modern case has the Court recognized the legitimacy of pluralist compromise as 
the exclusive basis for legislation.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Declaration of Constitutional Principles, 102 CONG. REC. 4460, 4515–16 (1956) 
(statement of Sen. Walter F. George, widely known as “The Southern Manifesto”) (“[T]he 
decision of the Supreme Court in the school cases [is] a clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes 
a trend in the Federal Judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of 
Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the States and the people.”); Antonin 
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 39–
40 (1997) (arguing that the common law method of interpreting law is “not the way of 
construing a democratically adopted text”); John G. Roberts, Jr., Draft Article on Judicial 
Restraint (1981), http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-89-0372/doc006.pdf 
(“A second means by which courts arrogate to themselves functions reserved to the legislative 
branch or the states is through so-called ‘fundamental rights’ and ‘suspect class’ analyses, both 
of which invite broad judicial scrutiny of the essentially legislative task of classification.”). 
 21. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
 22. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
032006 05_MILLHISER.DOC 4/24/2006  12:29 PM 
410 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:405 
process.”23 The modern understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, however, “accord[s] special protection to those who 
ha[ve] been deprived of their fair share of political influence.”24 In 
these cases, a “judicial conclusion that a fair democratic process 
would have generated outcomes systematically more favorable” to 
those without influence is warranted.25 
Of course, not every minority is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but rather only those minorities who find it “especially 
difficult . . . to strike bargains with potential coalition partners.”26 In a 
pluralistic system, minorities are able to participate in the political 
process by finding allies outside of their discrete group. These may be 
natural allies, as when African American and Latino voters unite in 
support of affirmative action, or they may be more uneasy alliances, 
such as social conservatives and libertarians joining forces to elect a 
president who will ban gay marriage and cut taxes, but such alliances 
are an integral part of a pluralistic system. 
The system of local school funding challenged in Rodriguez is 
exactly the sort of “political process” against which the Fourteenth 
Amendment is designed to offer protection. Under that system, 
school districts depend on local property taxes to fund their 
programs.27 Districts in wealthy areas receive a windfall, as they draw 
their funding from a substantial tax base; districts in poorer areas are 
left out in the cold.28 Additionally, poorer districts operating under 
this or similar systems almost always tax their residents at a higher 
rate to make up for the revenue shortfall, but these higher property 
taxes are rarely sufficient to bridge the wealth chasm.29 
 
 23. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 715–16. 
 26. Id. at 720. Ackerman’s essay goes on to critique this pluralist understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as insufficient to preserve civil rights in the modern era, but he 
concedes that this understanding is the “first insight” of the Carolene Products decision and the 
cases stemming from it. Id. at 740. 
 27. 411 U.S. at 10. 
 28. For an excellent discussion of this problem of school funding, see generally JOHN E. 
COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 38–199 (1970). 
 29. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 75–76 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he poorest districts tend 
to have the highest tax rates and the richest districts . . . the lowest tax rates. Yet, despite the 
apparent extra effort being made by the poorest districts, they are unable even to begin to match 
the richest districts in terms of the production of local revenues.”); COONS, supra note 28, at 50 
(explaining that the problem of poorer districts carrying higher tax burdens and yet receiving 
fewer funds existed for decades before the Rodriguez decision). 
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It is this insurmountable chasm that reflects the invidiousness of 
the local funding system. Residents of poorer districts want adequate 
funding for their children’s schools. They vote for greater funding for 
those schools, and they even agree to higher local taxes to pay for 
those schools. Yet, the political process gives them no recourse. So 
long as this localized funding is maintained, residents of poorer 
districts will be unable to “safeguard their own interest through the 
political process.”30 It is exactly this kind of powerlessness that the 
Fourteenth Amendment is intended to prevent. 
Of course, just because localized funding prevents recourse to a 
local legislature does not mean that a judicial remedy is mandated by 
the Constitution. As previously discussed, the Constitution only 
requires that citizens be able to seek meaningful redress from some 
branch of government;31 proving that local legislatures are 
incompetent to provide an adequate education does not preclude 
seeking relief from the state legislature. As the next Section will 
discuss, however, state legislatures are no better suited to provide the 
poor with an adequate education than are local legislatures. 
B. State Legislatures and the Problem of Legislature Capture 
A legislator who is “not primarily interested in reelection will not 
achieve reelection as often as [one] who [is so] interested.”32 As a 
result, the primary goal of an elected legislator is most often 
reelection, lest that legislator risk becoming the victim of electoral 
Darwinism. This reality is neither surprising nor inappropriate, as 
electoral accountability is one of the principal advantages of a 
democracy,33 but this advantage does not come without a price. In a 
society with limited resources, each voter wants the biggest piece of 
the pie, and so the American democracy rewards those legislators 
who can deliver the greatest benefits to their constituents, often at the 
 
 30. Ackerman, supra note 23, at 715. 
 31. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
 32. MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 
39–40 (1977). 
 33. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 352 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(explaining that the purpose of “frequent elections” is “to support in the members [of Congress] 
an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people”); see also Austin v. Mich. State 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 706 (1990) (“Though our era may not be alone in 
deploring the lack of mechanisms for holding candidates accountable for the votes they cast, 
that lack of accountability is one of the major concerns of our time.”). 
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expense of voters in other districts.34 Because of this motivation on 
the part of legislators, the minority of the electorate who reside in 
poorer districts with less-educated residents are often the victims of 
an electoral process that encourages elected officials to favor their 
own district above all others. 
To make matters worse, many of the voters in these districts are 
constructively disenfranchised by their inadequate education. 
According to the United States Census Bureau, college graduates are 
nearly one and one-half times as likely to vote as high school 
graduates and more than twice as likely to vote as Americans with 
eight or fewer years of education.35 Furthermore, even if less-
educated Americans do cast ballots, they often lack the basic reading 
skills and civic knowledge necessary to understand just what it is they 
are voting for.36 So it should come as no surprise that the political 
branches have proved just as inadequate in providing a baseline 
 
 34. See FIORINA, supra note 32, at 40 (“Each of us favors an arrangement in which our 
fellow citizens pay for our benefits.”). 
 35. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 290 
(2000), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/sec08.pdf. The Census Bureau 
provides the following data on the correlation between education levels and voter turnout: 
 
 Percentage of Citizens Reporting They Voted, by Year 
School Years Completed 1980 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Eight Years or Less 42.6 32.7 36.7 27.7 35.1 23.2 28.1 24.6 
Some High School 45.6 33.8 41.3 30.9 41.2 27.0 33.8 25.0 
Completed High School 58.9 44.1 54.7 42.2 57.5 40.5 49.1 37.1 
Three Years of College 
 or Less 
67.2 49.9 64.5 50.0 68.7 49.1 60.5 46.2 
Four Years of College  
or More 
79.9 62.5 77.6 62.5 81.0 63.1 73.0 57.2 
 
It is possible to read this chart as merely demonstrating increased apathy among less-educated 
voters and thus to dismiss this problem as less-educated voters simply waiving their right to 
vote. Even if this is the case, given the intimate connection between education and the ability to 
intelligently exercise the franchise discussed in Part IV, infra, the state should still be held 
accountable for a system that encourages voters in one school district to waive their rights, while 
encouraging the opposite in other districts. See infra notes 151–154 and accompanying text 
(explaining how modern voting rights jurisprudence protects against laws which create obstacles 
to the lawful exercise of the franchise). 
 36. See infra Part IV (explaining why an adequate education is a necessary prerequisite to 
the fundamental right to vote). 
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education to both rich and poor Americans as they were in combating 
Jim Crow segregation.37 
Dissenting in Rodriguez, Justice Marshall highlighted the futility 
of seeking a state legislative solution to educational inequities: 
The District Court in this case postponed decision for some two 
years in the hope that the Texas Legislature would remedy the gross 
disparities in treatment inherent in the Texas financing scheme. It 
was only after the legislature failed to act in its 1971 Regular Session 
that the District Court, apparently recognizing the lack of hope for 
self-initiated legislative reform, rendered its decision.38 
This “lack of hope” has been borne out by numerous instances of 
states willing to address pressing educational needs only when held at 
knifepoint by an active judiciary.39 
At least nineteen state supreme courts have parted ways with 
Rodriguez, holding either that their state constitution requires equal 
education funding, or that their state system fails to provide an 
adequate education.40 Although these state-level suits more often fail 
 
 37. See Chas. H. Thompson, Court Action the Only Reasonable Alternative to Remedy 
Immediate Abuses of the Negro Separate School, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 419, 422 (1935) (“[I]t is no 
longer a question of whether Negroes should resort to the courts as a means of removing 
present abuses. They must resort to the courts. They have no other reasonable, legitimate 
alternative.”); see also Thurgood Marshall, The Legal Attack to Secure Civil Rights, in 
THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND 
REMINISCENCES 90, 95 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001). Justice Marshall viewed the United States 
Supreme Court as a unique bulwark against racism: 
The threats of many of the bigots in the South to disregard the ruling of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in the recent Texas Primary decision has not intimidated a 
single person. . . . Election officials in states affected by this decision will either let 
Negroes vote in the Democratic Primaries, or they will be subjected to both criminal 
and civil prosecution . . . . 
Id. For an account of the NAACP’s legal strategy, see generally MARK V. TUSHNET, THE 
NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (1987). 
 38. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 71 n.2 (1972) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public 
Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (2003) (“Desegregation will not occur 
without judicial action . . . .”). 
 39. See infra Part II.B (advocating the need for an active judiciary as a weapon against 
reluctant legislatures); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 1600 (“[D]esegregation lacks 
sufficient national and local political support for elected officials to remedy the problem.”). 
 40. See, e.g., Ala. Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117 (Ala. 
Cir. Ct., Montgomery County, filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 
624 So. 2d 107, 110–11 (Ala. 1993) (“[T]he system of public schools fails to provide equitable 
and adequate educational opportunities to all schoolchildren . . . .”); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. 
Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 816 (Ariz. 1994) (“[T]he Arizona Constitution requires the 
legislature to enact appropriate laws to finance education in the public schools in a way that 
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than succeed,41 they have become the primary vehicle for challenging 
educational inadequacy. They demonstrate the massive resistance 
that state legislatures are willing to exert when faced with a 
constitutional mandate to provide an adequate education. As Justice 
Pfeifer explained in an Ohio Supreme Court opinion overturning that 
state’s school funding system, “[t]he General Assembly has long been 
aware that the current funding structure is constitutionally flawed. It 
has been impossible to adequately address the problem because 
wealthy school districts have staunchly defended the status quo. This 
decision rejects the status quo and requires the General Assembly to 
act.”42 
As an examination of one state’s struggle with educational 
adequacy reveals, however, state courts often believe they have 
required a legislature to act, only to find that their decision has been 
ignored. The state of Arkansas’s struggle with educational civil rights 
 
does not itself create substantial disparities among schools, communities or districts.”); DuPree 
v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983) (“[T]he educational opportunity of the 
children in this state should not be controlled by the fortuitous circumstance of residence . . . .”); 
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (“[F]or purposes of assessing our 
state public school financing system in light of our state constitutional provisions guaranteeing 
equal protection of the laws (1) discrimination in educational opportunity on the basis of district 
wealth involves a suspect classification, and (2) education is a fundamental interest.”); Rose v. 
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989) (“[W]e have, by this decision, 
declared the system of common schools in Kentucky to be unconstitutional . . . .”); Claremont 
Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1354 (N.H. 1997) (“In this appeal we hold that the 
present system of financing elementary and secondary public education in New Hampshire is 
unconstitutional.”); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood II), 804 S.W.2d 491, 498 
(Tex. 1991) (“[W]e therefore hold as a matter of law that the public school finance system 
continues to violate article VII, section 1 of the Constitution.”); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 
386 (Vt. 1997) (per curiam) (“[T]he current system for funding public education in Vermont, 
with its substantial dependence on local property taxes and resultant wide disparities in 
revenues available to local school districts, deprives children of an equal educational 
opportunity in violation of the Vermont Constitution.”). 
 41. See Liz Kramer, Achieving Equitable Education Through the Courts: A Comparative 
Analysis of Three States, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 6 (2002) (noting that although Rodriguez-style suits 
have been brought in at least forty-three different states, only nineteen state courts have ruled 
in the plaintiffs’ favor). 
 42. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 781 (Ohio 1997) (Pfeifer, J., concurring); see also 
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 132 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“The Court’s suggestions of legislative redress and experimentation will doubtless be of great 
comfort to the schoolchildren of Texas’ disadvantaged districts, but considering the vested 
interests of wealthy school districts in the preservation of the status quo, they are worth little 
more.”). 
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began in 1983 with DuPree v. Alma School District No. 30.43 In 
DuPree, the Arkansas Supreme Court declared that the state’s 
educational funding system bore “no rational relationship to the 
educational needs of the individual districts” and held that there was 
no “legitimate state purpose to support the system.”44 The court in 
DuPree found that the highest and lowest revenues per pupil in 
Arkansas’s school districts were $2,378 and $873, respectively, and 
that the difference at the 95th and 5th percentiles was $1,576 and 
$937.45 It blamed this disparity on the gap in property wealth, which 
ranged from an average of $73,773 to an average of $1,853 per 
taxpayer.46 
Concurring in DuPree, Justice Hickman offered a prescient 
warning to the state legislature: 
Equality is, of course, mostly an ideal or goal, and hardly ever a 
reality in government. Reasons are always given for not requiring 
equality but they are usually no more than excuses, and I do not 
hesitate to point out that if the Arkansas legislature approaches its 
new task with anything less than the goal of equality in dispensing 
state funds, it risks repeating the same mistakes that brought about 
this situation.47 
The Arkansas legislature did not heed this warning, and so the 
Arkansas courts were forced to consider this issue again more than a 
decade later.48 
In the 2000 case, Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee 
(Lake View II),49 the Arkansas Supreme Court once again found gross 
disparities in funding between wealthy and poor districts. Citing 
 
 43. 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983). For a helpful summary of Rodriguez-type litigation in 
Arkansas, see generally David R. Matthews, Lessons From Lake View: Some Questions and 
Answers from Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 56 ARK. L. REV. 519 (2003). 
 44. 651 S.W.2d at 93. 
 45. Id. at 92. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 96 (Hickman, J., concurring). 
 48. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View III), 91 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Ark. 
2002) (“On November 9, 1994, then-chancery judge Annabelle Clinton Imber found that the 
school-funding system did not violate the United States Constitution, but that it did violate the 
Education Article (Article 14, § 1) and the Equality provisions (Article 2, §§ 2, 3, and 18) of the 
Arkansas Constitution.”). Judge (now Justice) Imber’s original opinion is unpublished. 
 49. 10 S.W.3d 892 (Ark. 2000). Lake View I was a 1996 Arkansas Supreme Court decision 
dismissing an appeal for lack of a final judgment. See Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25, 917 
S.W.2d 530, 533 (Ark. 1996) (dismissing an appeal from the Pulaski County Chancery Court for 
lack of a final order). 
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numbers similar to those in DuPree, the court in Lake View II found 
that the wealthiest Arkansas school districts were spending almost 
twice as much per pupil as the poorest districts.50 Two years later, in 
Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View III),51 the 
court once again held that the Arkansas education system violated 
the state’s constitution.52 In so holding, the court looked beyond mere 
numbers to see the tangible costs of unequal funding: poorer districts 
languished under a “barebones” curriculum, while the wealthiest 
districts offered courses such as “German, fashion merchandising, and 
marketing.”53 Furthermore, even such basic necessities as “rainproof 
buildings, sufficient bathrooms, computers for its students, and 
laboratory equipment that function[ed]” were often lacking in the 
poorest districts.54 Nineteen years after the Arkansas Supreme 
Court’s holding in DuPree, the state legislature had done practically 
nothing to correct a constitutional violation. 
Despite the legislature’s recalcitrance, the court in Lake View III 
stayed its decision until January 1, 2004, to give “the General 
Assembly an opportunity to meet in General Session and the 
Department of Education time to implement appropriate changes.”55 
Now faced with the real possibility of a mandatory injunction 
requiring the state treasurer to fund education adequately,56 the 
Arkansas legislature finally took action to obey its state’s 
constitution. In 2004, more than two decades after its decision in 
DuPree, a divided 4–3 court released jurisdiction over the Lake View 
 
 50. See 10 S.W.3d at 894 (“[D]isparities in per pupil expenditures in the 1992/93 school year 
ranged from $4,064 spent per pupil in the Little Rock School District to $2,270 spent per pupil 
in the Mountain View School District.”). 
 51. 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002). 
 52. See id. at 495 (“[T]he State has not fulfilled its constitutional duty to provide the 
children of this state with a general, suitable, and efficient school-funding system. Accordingly, 
we hold that the current school-funding system violates the Education Article of the Arkansas 
Constitution . . . .”). The court’s holding in Lake View III went beyond that of their holding in 
DuPree. Although DuPree merely held that public school students have an equal protection 
right to equal funding regardless of district, 651 S.W.2d at 93, Lake View III held both that “the 
current school-funding system violates the equal-protection sections of the Arkansas 
Constitution,” 91 S.W.3d at 500, and that “the State has an absolute duty under our constitution 
to provide an adequate education to each school child,” id. at 495. 
 53. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 497. 
 54. Id. at 498. 
 55. Id. at 511. 
 56. See Matthews, supra note 43, at 540 (“A mandatory injunction ordering the State 
Treasurer to ‘adequately’ fund the education system seems a likely prospective remedy.”). 
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matter.57 Although the majority cited “laudable” progress in areas 
such as “accounting and accountability,”58 it also issued a stern 
warning to the state legislature: 
The resolve of this court is clear. We will not waver in our 
commitment to the goal of an adequate and substantially equal 
education for all Arkansas students; nor will we waver from the 
constitutional requirement that our State is to ever maintain a 
general, suitable, and efficient system of free public schools. Make 
no mistake, this court will exercise the power and authority of the 
judiciary at any time to assure that the students of our State will not 
fall short of the goal set forth by this court. We will assure its 
attainment.59 
In dissent, Justice Corbin went even further, declaring a total lack of 
confidence in the legislature: 
I also do not agree with the majority that we should simply 
presume that government officials are going to do what they say 
they will do. Government officials have been saying that they would 
remedy the public school system of this state since this court’s 
opinion in Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30. Twenty-one years later 
we are still faced with the dilemma that our education system is 
unconstitutional. Today, however, we have the opportunity to 
ensure that another twenty-one years do not pass before a remedy is 
devised, funded, and implemented.60 
The lesson of DuPree and Lake View is that a state legislature 
cannot be trusted to ensure the proper education of all students. For 
twenty-one years, the Arkansas legislature ignored a constitutional 
mandate, acknowledging its duty only after decades of effort by an 
active judiciary. Nor is Arkansas’s case an isolated one. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court held that state’s education funding scheme 
unconstitutional in 1973.61 Yet in 1997, that court again reached the 
same holding while simultaneously expressing its lack of faith in a 
 
 57. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View IV), No. 01-836, 2004 Ark. 
LEXIS 425, at *40 (Ark. June 18, 2004) (“[W]e release jurisdiction of this case and the mandate 
will issue.”). 
 58. Id. at *35. 
 59. Id. at *40–41 (quotation omitted). 
 60. Id. at *66–67 (Corbin, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 61. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (N.J. 1973) (“A system of instruction in any 
district of the State which is not thorough and efficient falls short of the constitutional 
command.”). 
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political solution.62 In 2003, the Supreme Court of Nevada was forced 
to enjoin its own legislature after that body unconstitutionally refused 
to fund education entirely in order to avoid raising taxes.63 Perhaps 
the most egregious example of legislative hostility to educational civil 
rights occurred in Alabama. When that state’s supreme court 
declared Alabama’s education funding scheme to be 
unconstitutional,64 the legislature voted to amend the state 
constitution to overturn the court’s decision.65 
The Rodriguez Court’s assertion that “fundamental reforms with 
respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for the 
legislative process[]”66 is as naive as it is cruel. Legislatures, by design, 
are hostile to minority interests; they cannot be trusted to provide 
educational civil rights without the closest supervision from the 
courts. By abdicating their responsibility to provide a meaningful 
forum to address educational adequacy, the courts ensure this basic 
civil right will never be attained. 
II.  LIABILITY IS NOT ENOUGH:  
THE NEED FOR A MEANINGFUL REMEDY 
In order for the courts to be a meaningful forum for educational 
civil rights cases, they must be able to provide effective remedies. Yet 
 
 62. The New Jersey Supreme Court held: 
  Our Constitution requires that public school children be given the opportunity to 
receive a thorough and efficient education. . . . 
. . . . 
  It is against that backdrop, and the inescapable reality of a continuing profound 
constitutional deprivation that has penalized generations of children, that one must 
evaluate an alternative, “wait and see” approach. . . . In light of the constitutional 
rights at stake, the persistence and depth of the constitutional deprivation, and in the 
absence of any real prospect for genuine educational improvement in the most needy 
districts, that approach is no longer an option. 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 445 (N.J. 1997). 
 63. See Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269, 1276 (Nev. 2003) (“The Legislature 
must resume its work of funding education and selecting appropriate methods of revenue 
generation to balance the state’s budget.”). 
 64. See Ala. Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117 (Ala. Cir. 
Ct., Montgomery County, filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 
So. 2d 107, 110–11 (Ala. 1993) (“[T]he system of public schools fails to provide equitable and 
adequate educational opportunities to all schoolchildren . . . .”). 
 65. See ALA. CONST. amend. DLXXXII (“No order of a state court, which requires 
disbursement of state funds, shall be binding on the state or any state official until the order has 
been approved by a simple majority of both houses of the Legislature.”). 
 66. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973). 
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the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, at the urging of conservative 
Presidents, have rolled back important precedents that previously 
ensured educational civil rights judgments would be meaningfully 
enforced. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,67 
the Warren Court held that “[o]nce a right and a violation have been 
shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past 
wrongs is broad . . . .”68 Fifteen years later, the Reagan administration 
published the Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation (“Guidelines”), 
which required federal government attorneys to utilize a narrow, 
conservative methodology when litigating constitutional cases.69 
According to these Reaganic verses, broad equitable relief violates 
Article III of the Constitution when it affects people other than “the 
parties immediately involved in the litigation.”70 In other words, the 
Guidelines encouraged federal attorneys to argue that courts are 
powerless to provide certain remedies, even when those remedies are 
essential to eliminating a continuing constitutional violation. The 
Guidelines’ reasoning was instrumental to a decision three years after 
its publication that effectively ended meaningful school 
desegregation.71 
This Note rejects the reasoning of the Guidelines, and will argue 
that the Court was wrong to reject the broad view of equitable relief 
captured in Swann. This broad view grew out of the Court’s 
frustration with “[d]eliberate resistance” on the part of states subject 
to desegregation orders.72 In the seventeen years between Brown v. 
Board of Education (Brown I)73 and Swann, the Court learned that 
broad equitable remedies were an essential part of breaking the 
campaign of “massive resistance” that grew out of opposition to 
integration. As this Part argues, the Court was right to adopt such a 
viewpoint when the alternative was allowing states to flout the 
Constitution. Similarly, the broad view of equity advanced in Swann 
is as essential to educational equity as it was to school desegregation. 
 
 67. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 68. Id. at 15. 
 69. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POL’Y, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LITIGATION 3 (Feb. 19, 1988) [hereinafter GUIDELINES] (“[G]overnment attorneys should 
advance constitutional arguments based only on [the] ‘original meaning.’”). 
 70. Id. at 118. 
 71. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) (holding that previously 
segregated schools were free to resegregate once a moment of integration was achieved). 
 72. 402 U.S. at 13. 
 73. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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By adopting the conservative stance on equitable relief, the courts 
ensure that educational adequacy will always remain a dream 
deferred. 
A. The Slow Death of Equity 
Just one year after its famous decision declaring school 
segregation unconstitutional, the Court engaged in an equally famous 
act of hedging. In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II),74 the 
Court decreed that desegregation need only move forward with “all 
deliberate speed,”75 and the South was jubilant. One Louisiana state 
legislator called Brown II “the mildest decree the Supreme Court 
possibly could have handed down.”76 A Florida politician announced 
that the Court had “realized it made a mistake in May and is getting 
out of it the best way it can.”77 Numerous Southern lawmakers 
suggested that desegregation would not be “feasible” for another fifty 
or one hundred years.78 
The Brown II decision was motivated far more by politics than 
by a belief in constitutional limitations. Far from adopting the ‘vision 
of judicial restraint that would later be voiced in the Guidelines, 
Brown II expressly acknowledged that courts enjoy “practical 
flexibility in shaping . . . [equitable] remedies,” even when such 
remedies apply broadly.79 Instead, Brown II was intended largely as a 
“peace offering to white southerners,” born of the hope that by 
exercising less than its full power, the Court could encourage swifter 
desegregation.80 
Within months, it became clear that Brown II’s narrow remedy 
was a miscalculation.81 “White Citizen’s Councils,” emboldened by 
the Court’s cravenness, formed to use all methods short of violence to 
resist integration. Several states passed “interposition” resolutions 
claiming that Brown I was an “illegal encroachment.”82 Eighty-one 
 
 74. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 75. Id. at 301. 
 76. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 319 (2004). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. 349 U.S. at 300. 
 80. KLARMAN, supra note 76, at 319. 
 81. See id. at 320 (“That Brown II was a mistake from the Court’s perspective was quickly 
apparent.”). 
 82. Id. 
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Southern members of Congress signed a “Southern Manifesto” 
pledging “to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this 
decision.”83 
In 1955, it was possible for the Justices, in a good faith effort to 
desegregate public schools, to stay their hands and hope for voluntary 
compliance from the states.84 By the time that Richard Nixon became 
president, however, it was readily apparent that Brown II’s remedy 
resulted in “entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed.”85 
Nevertheless, upon the confirmation of their third and fourth 
numbers to the Supreme Court, President Nixon’s Justices began 
dismantling the judiciary’s ability to provide meaningful remedies in 
educational civil rights cases. 
The Nixon Justices’ first attack on Brown I came in the first 
Milliken v. Bradley.86 Joined by Justice Stewart, the Nixon four held 
that a federal court could not integrate the unconstitutionally 
segregated Detroit school district by busing students across state-
drawn district lines.87 Moreover, the Court reached this holding 
despite the fact that a low minority population in Detroit meant that 
cross-district busing was the only available means to desegregate the 
Detroit schools.88 In a subsequent proceeding, the Court held that 
although actual desegregation was not available as a remedy, a 
district court could provide “remedial education programs” to 
compensate the victims of discrimination.89 The pre-Brown Court had 
a name for this kind of remedy: “separate but equal.”90 
Supreme Court hostility to civil rights only grew through the 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush presidencies. Perhaps the final nail in 
Brown’s coffin came with the Rehnquist Court’s holding in Board of 
 
 83. Declaration of Constitutional Principles, supra note 20, at 4460. 
 84. See KLARMAN, supra note 76, at 320 (“To say that Brown II was misguided is not to say 
that the justices calculated foolishly.”). 
 85. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964). 
 86. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 87. Id. at 746–47 (“Unless petitioners drew the district lines in a discriminatory fashion, or 
arranged for white students residing in the Detroit District to attend schools in Oakland and 
Macomb Counties, they were under no constitutional duty to make provisions for Negro 
students to do so.”). 
 88. See id. at 747 n.22 (“[T]he constitutional principles applicable in school desegregation 
cases cannot vary in accordance with the size or population dispersal of the particular city, 
county, or school district as compared with neighboring areas.”). 
 89. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 279 (1977). 
 90. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Education v. Dowell.91 The Court in Dowell held that “federal 
supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary 
measure to remedy past discrimination,”92 and thus a momentarily 
desegregated district, one which had achieved “unitary status,”93 was 
free to recreate segregated neighborhood schools.94 Moreover, in 
reaching this decision, the Court implicitly adopted the Guidelines’ 
position that once a constitutional “violation is remedied, the court’s 
jurisdiction ceases.”95 
The effects of this holding have been as disastrous as they were 
predictable. On the day Brown I was decided in 1954, only 0.001 
percent of African American students in the South attended majority 
white schools.96 This percentage increased every year it was measured 
until 1991, reaching a peak of 43.5 percent in 1988.97 In the wake of 
Dowell-style resegregation, however, this progress is slowly being 
lost. The number of Southern black students attending majority white 
schools has declined every year since Dowell and is now at its lowest 
point since 1970.98 
The speed with which resegregation occurs once the courts 
abdicate their role in maintaining integration is demonstrated by one 
Texas district. Once the Austin Independent School District was 
declared unitary in 1983, the federal district court relinquished 
jurisdiction in 1986, and the local board redrew attendance zones to 
 
 91. 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 92. Id. at 247. 
 93. Id. at 244. 
 94. See GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE 
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 19 (1996) (“A court-supervised district 
that has never been declared unitary is obligated under the law to avoid actions that create 
segregated and unequal schools. But after a declaration of unitary status, the courts presume 
any government action creating racially segregated schools to be innocent . . . .”). 
 95. GUIDELINES, supra note 69, at 120. 
 96. ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED 
SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 37 tbl.10 (2003), http://www.civilrightsproject. 
harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf. 
 97. Id. Although the Supreme Court first allowed a “unitary” district to be resegregated in 
1991, the process began five years earlier with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Riddick v. School 
Board of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986). Riddick was the first federal court case to allow 
a school district, once declared unitary, to return to segregated neighborhood schools. See id. at 
535 (“[O]nce the goal of a unitary school system is achieved, the district court’s role ends.”); 
ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 94, at xxiii (explaining that Riddick was the first federal case to 
allow a unitary school district to dismantle its desegregation plan). 
 98. FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 96, at 37 tbl.10. 
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create segregated neighborhood schools.99 In 1991, almost one-third 
of the elementary schools had minority (nonwhite) enrollments of 
more than 80 percent, even though a majority of the district’s students 
were not minorities.100 When the case reached the Fifth Circuit, the 
court was obliged to follow Dowell,101 even though the student 
reassignments created the segregation in fourteen of the nineteen 
imbalanced schools.102 In a special concurrence, Judge John Minor 
Wisdom opined that the disparities between white and minority 
schools were so great that they would be unconstitutional even under 
Plessy v. Ferguson.103 
Professor Jack Balkin has observed that “[i]t is often said that no 
theory of constitutional interpretation is sound if it cannot explain 
and justify Brown v. Board of Education,”104 and yet the Supreme 
Court has constructively overturned this iconic decision, allowing 
schools to resegregate after only a moment of integration. As the 
Austin example demonstrates, elected school boards and state 
legislatures cannot be trusted to maintain Brown’s legacy. Integration 
must come from meaningful judicial remedies, or it will not come at 
all. 
B. What Should Have Been Done 
One purpose of the Constitution is to “withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond 
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal 
principles to be applied by the courts.”105 Accordingly, when a state 
flouts its proper role, routinely abridging the constitutionally granted 
rights of its citizens, the courts must enjoy broad latitude in restoring 
these rights.106 As both the battle over desegregation and the state of 
Arkansas’s struggle with educational civil rights demonstrate, the 
courts cannot be shy in exercising this power. The Arkansas 
 
 99. ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 94, at 20. 
 100. Price v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 1307, 1322 (5th Cir. 1991) (Wisdom, J., 
specially concurring). 
 101. Id. at 1313–14. 
 102. ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 94, at 20. 
 103. Price, 945 F.2d at 1322 (Wisdom, J., specially concurring). 
 104. JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID x–xi 
(2001). 
 105. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
 106. See infra Part III (describing the courts’ power to impose affirmative duties upon states 
violating the Constitution). 
032006 05_MILLHISER.DOC 4/24/2006  12:29 PM 
424 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:405 
legislature ignored its constitutional duties for over twenty years, only 
reluctantly taking action when a firm deadline was imposed by the 
courts.107 Regrettably, the United States Supreme Court was equally 
slow to learn the importance of swift and certain judicial action. 
When the Court displayed its tragic “lack of firm resolve” in 
Brown II, Southern resistance to desegregation was “inevitable”108 
and came in the form of disingenuous “freedom-of-choice plans”109—
efforts by states to “interpose” their own authority against that of the 
Constitution110—and, of course, famous resistance from Southern 
governors like George Wallace and Orval Faubus.111 Although the 
Court eventually reversed course, declaring, sixteen years after 
Brown I, that courts may take “affirmative action . . . to achieve truly 
nondiscriminatory assignments,”112 by then it was too late. Richard 
Nixon was already president; the Court had squandered its liberal 
majority, and it has yet to regain its historic concern for civil rights.113 
 
 107. See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text (chronicling the Arkansas legislature’s 
defiance of a court order). 
 108. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED 124 (2004); see also 
Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 1604 (“One must ask whether it would have made a difference 
had the Supreme Court in Brown II, or [in] a case soon thereafter, imposed timetables and 
detailed remedies for desegregation.”). 
 109. See OGLETREE, supra note 108, at 125 (“[F]reedom-of-choice plans emerged as the 
most common response to Brown. These plans repeatedly failed to yield any significant 
desegregation.”). Freedom-of-choice plans allowed black children to choose to attend 
historically white schools, but did not mandate integration. See Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 
776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (per curiam) (upholding South Carolina’s freedom-of-choice plan). 
Shortly after Brown, many federal district courts engaged in tenuous legal arguments to justify 
their constitutionality. See, e.g., id. (“[N]o violation of the Constitution is involved even though 
the children of different races voluntarily attend different schools, as they attend different 
churches.”). These plans were eventually declared unconstitutional where they failed to 
effectively bring about integration. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968) 
(“‘Freedom of choice’ is not a sacred talisman; it is only a means to a constitutionally required 
end . . . . If the means prove effective, it is acceptable, but if it fails to undo segregation, other 
means must be used to achieve this end.’” (quoting Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 
333 (4th Cir. 1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring) (footnote omitted))). 
 110. See OGLETREE, supra note 108, at 130 (describing the Southern interposition 
movement, which claimed that states had the authority to protect their citizens from unjust 
actions by the federal government). 
 111. See id. at 128–29 (describing the two governors’ use of segregation as the focal point of 
their election strategy). As Professor Ogletree explains, both Wallace and Faubus “began as 
moderates on race issues, but later found that the key to success lay in vehemently opposing 
integration.” Id. at 128. When Wallace lost his 1960 bid for the Democratic gubernatorial 
nomination in Alabama, he famously “declared that he would never be ‘outniggered’ again.” Id. 
 112. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971). 
 113. See Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 1601 (“Four Justices appointed by President 
Richard Nixon are largely to blame for the decisions of the 1970s . . . .”). 
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In the field of public education, the doctrine of judicial restraint 
has no place. The courts can depend neither on the goodwill of 
legislatures114 nor on the integrity of their own membership in the face 
of appointees hostile to civil rights. Furthermore, if education truly is 
the “principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to 
adjust normally to his environment,”115 then each minute that children 
are denied their right to an adequate education can only drive them 
deeper into a hole from which they may never recover. A responsible 
court cannot gamble with these lives. It must demand timely action 
through rigid deadlines backed by injunctions.116 Doing otherwise will 
ensure its decisions will never be meaningfully enforced. 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT AND  
AFFIRMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Having taken a stance against what conservatives call “judicial 
restraint”—deferring to the legislative branches even when such 
deference encourages states to defy the Constitution—this Note 
proposes an alternative method of constitutional interpretation and 
demonstrates how that method could be used to provide the 
educational civil rights denied in Rodriguez. As the majority of this 
Note has focused on philosophical questions about the proper role of 
courts, it is tempting to view the remaining three Parts as little more 
than an afterthought. This structure is intentional, however, because 
it is necessary to call attention to just how broad an impact the 
Court’s institutional competency jurisprudence has on Americans 
unable to seek redress through the political process. The contraction 
of educational civil rights is merely a symptom of a larger disease, and 
so this Part will focus on curing this greater malady. 
It is hardly a revolutionary idea that the Constitution places an 
affirmative duty on the states to act in accordance with its mandates.117 
 
 114. See supra notes 42–65 and accompanying text. 
 115. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 116. See Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 1620 (suggesting that if the Court had provided 
more aggressive remedies in the years between Brown and Swann, desegregation might have 
occurred more quickly). 
 117. Cf. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968) (“School boards such as the 
respondent then operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with 
the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in 
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”). 
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Nor is it particularly radical to claim that the courts have an 
affirmative duty to ensure that this mandate is met.118 Yet the 
dominant conservative view of the Constitution is that the courts 
should defer to branches that are structurally incapable of providing 
certain rights, or worse, that courts should hear a case, find a 
constitutional violation, but refuse to remedy the violation.119 Such a 
proposition is, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “too 
extravagant to be maintained.”120 
Nevertheless, it is one thing to argue that the courts have a duty 
to hear pleas for redress of grievances,121 and another thing altogether 
to suggest that a particular right—for example, the right to an 
adequate education—is among those protected by the Constitution. 
This Part attempts to build a progressive constitutional framework 
from which such a right can emerge. Like the first two Parts of this 
Note, this framework’s methodology is rooted in the notion that the 
Constitution cannot be read both to grant a right and to deny the very 
tools which give that right meaning. Accordingly, this Part argues that 
when a new right becomes essential to the maintenance of a 
preexisting constitutional right, that new right must also be protected 
by the Constitution, even if this imposes an affirmative duty on the 
states. 
Although the Court has yet to embrace this methodology fully, it 
has been used in several constitutional cases. In Gideon v. 
Wainwright,122 for example, the Supreme Court recognized an 
affirmative constitutional right to appointed counsel for indigent 
criminal defendants in state cases.123 The Court recognized that 
“‘[assistance of counsel] is one of the safeguards of the Sixth 
Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights 
 
 118. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . 
arising under this Constitution . . . .”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) 
(“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. 
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that 
rule.”). 
 119. See supra notes 86–103 and accompanying text (explaining that Court’s refusal to grant 
meaningful remedies in the Bradley and Dowell cases). 
 120. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179. 
 121. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (arguing that the courts should remain 
active in areas that cannot be effectively governed by the other branches). 
 122. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 123. See id. at 344 (holding that a fair trial cannot be achieved “if the poor man charged with 
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him”). 
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of life and liberty’”;124 accordingly, a mere right to be free from 
interference in seeking assistance from counsel was held insufficient 
to preserve the rights of the poor.125 
Criminal defendants enjoy numerous affirmative rights under the 
Gideon principle. In Ake v. Oklahoma,126 the Court extended Gideon 
to include a right to state-funded psychiatric assistance for indigent 
defendants invoking an insanity defense.127 In so holding, the Court 
reaffirmed its commitment to imposing affirmative duties on the 
states when such duties are necessary to preserve constitutional 
rights. “[W]hen a State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent 
defendant in a criminal proceeding,” wrote Justice Marshall for the 
Court, “it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair 
opportunity to present his defense.”128 Similarly, in Miranda v. 
Arizona,129 the Court held that because “the threshold requirement 
for an intelligent decision as to [a right’s] exercise”130 is knowledge of 
the right’s very existence, states have an affirmative duty to inform 
criminal defendants of their rights while in custody.131 
Affirmative constitutional rights are not limited to the criminal 
context. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics,132 the Court held that there is an affirmative right to sue 
federal officers for violations of constitutional rights.133 In a famous 
concurrence, Justice Harlan highlighted the necessity of such an 
 
 124. Id. at 343 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)). 
 125. Id. at 344. 
 126. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
 127. See id. at 74 (“[W]hen a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at 
the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a 
State provide access to a psychiatrist’s assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot otherwise 
afford one.”). 
 128. Id. at 76. 
 129. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 130. Id. at 468. 
 131. Id. at 467–74. Admittedly, the constitutional status of Miranda has fluctuated. In 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), the Court held that Miranda warnings “were not 
themselves rights protected by the Constitution,” but rather were designed “to provide practical 
reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination.” Id. at 444. In Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), however, the Court reaffirmed that Miranda was 
“constitutionally based.” Id. at 440. 
 132. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 133. Id. at 391–92; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–18 (1980) (holding a right to 
sue to be implicit in the Eighth Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979) 
(holding a similar right to sue to be implicit in the Fifth Amendment). 
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affirmative right to the vindication of Bivens’ preexisting 
constitutional rights: 
  Putting aside the desirability of leaving the problem of federal 
official liability to the vagaries of common-law actions, it is apparent 
that some form of damages is the only possible remedy for someone 
in Bivens’ alleged position. It will be a rare case indeed in which an 
individual in Bivens’ position will be able to obviate the harm by 
securing injunctive relief from any court. However desirable a direct 
remedy against the Government might be as a substitute for 
individual official liability, the sovereign still remains immune to 
suit. Finally, assuming Bivens innocence of the crime charged, the 
“exclusionary rule” is simply irrelevant. For people in Bivens’ shoes, 
it is damages or nothing.134 
Although conservative appointments have led to broad exceptions to 
the Bivens doctrine, these exceptions only highlight the Supreme 
Court’s insistence that an affirmative constitutional right arises when 
such a right is necessary to the preservation of other preexisting 
constitutional rights. In Bush v. Lucas,135 the Court denied a Bivens 
suit to a government employee who was demoted after speaking out 
against his employer.136 Because Congress had already provided a 
regulatory scheme allowing federal employees to seek relief, an 
additional right to sue was not deemed necessary.137 Similarly, in 
Schweiker v. Chilicky,138 the Court denied a Bivens remedy to 
plaintiffs who had been unconstitutionally denied their Social 
Security benefits because the Social Security Act provided an 
administrative remedy.139 In both cases, the Court did not hold that a 
right to sue in federal court was guaranteed because it did not view 
such a right as necessary to the vindication of preexisting 
constitutional rights. 
 
 134. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409–10 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 135. 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
 136. Id. at 368, 370. 
 137. See id. at 388 (“The question is not what remedy the court should provide for a wrong 
that would otherwise go unredressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system . . . should be 
augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue.”). 
 138. 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
 139. See id. at 424–29 (“Congress is . . . charged with making the inevitable compromises 
required in the design of a massive and complex welfare benefits program. Congress has 
discharged that responsibility to the extent that it affects the case before us, and we see no legal 
basis that would allow us to revise its decision.” (citation omitted)). 
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Perhaps the most famous example of the Court’s imposing an 
affirmative duty on a state to preserve a preexisting constitutional 
right is itself an educational civil rights decision. In Green v. County 
School Board,140 the Court, frustrated by Southern refusal to obey its 
decision in Brown I, declared that local school boards were “clearly 
charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be 
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination 
would be eliminated root and branch.”141 Shortly thereafter, the Court 
gave sharp teeth to this assertion, upholding, in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,142 a district court’s imposition of 
several highly restrictive affirmative duties on the school board, 
including mandatory busing to achieve integration.143 
Significantly, the textual basis for the new right in each of these 
cases is the same as that of the preexisting right. Thus, the affirmative 
right to counsel in Gideon stems from the Sixth Amendment, and the 
right to integration through mandatory busing stems from the Equal 
Protection Clause. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services,144 however, the Court held that the purpose of the 
Due Process Clause “was to protect the people from the State, not to 
ensure that the State protected them from each other.”145 The Court’s 
holding stems from the belief that “[t]he Framers were content to 
leave the extent of governmental obligation in the latter area to the 
democratic political processes.”146 It is tempting to read DeShaney as 
precluding new rights from being found implicit in preexisting due 
process rights, but the DeShaney opinion also admitted that “in 
certain limited circumstances the Constitution imposes upon the State 
 
 140. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 141. Id. at 437–38. 
 142. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 143. See id. at 29–31 (1971) (upholding mandatory busing of white students to traditionally 
black schools and black students to traditionally white schools). 
 144. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 145. Id. at 196. 
 146. Id. Professor Steven Heyman, in an article published shortly after the Court’s decision 
in DeShaney, argues that Chief Justice Rehnquist mischaracterized history in asserting that 
affirmative rights are inconsistent with the Framers’ intent. See Steven J. Heyman, The First 
Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 509 
(1992) (“[T]he congressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment show that establishing a 
federal constitutional right to protection was one of the central purposes of the Amendment.”); 
see also Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 113 (1987) (statement 
of Judge Bork) (“Any judge who thought today he would go back to the original intent really 
ought to be accompanied by a guardian rather than be sitting on a bench.”). 
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affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular 
individuals.”147 “[T]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment,” for example, “requires the State to provide 
adequate medical care to incarcerated prisoners.”148 Similarly, the 
“Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires the State to 
provide involuntarily committed mental patients with such services as 
are necessary to ensure their ‘reasonable safety’ from themselves and 
others.”149 
DeShaney is not a good case for proponents of meaningful access 
to education, but these exceptions suggest that even the conservative 
Rehnquist Court was reluctant to discard the notion of constitutional 
necessity. The Court’s opinion explained that the exceptions to 
DeShaney were necessary “because the prisoner is unable by reason 
of the deprivation of his liberty [to] care for himself, [so] it is only just 
that the State be required to care for him.”150 Once again, the state 
assumes an affirmative constitutional duty necessary to preserve a 
preexisting constitutional right—when a state deprives incarcerated 
individuals of the ability to meet their own basic needs, it is required 
by the Eighth Amendment to ensure that those needs are met. 
IV.  EDUCATION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VOTE 
Although state legislatures may, under some circumstances, limit 
the franchise to certain individuals, once the franchise has been 
granted, it may not be diluted with respect to an eligible voter.151 In 
other words, under the right circumstances, a state legislature can 
deny the vote entirely,152 but, once granted, the right to vote must 
 
 147. 489 U.S. at 198. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 199. 
 150. Id. (quotations omitted). 
 151. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“When the state legislature vests the right to 
vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; 
and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the 
equal dignity owed to each voter.”); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) 
(“[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are 
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or 
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free 
exercise of the franchise.”). 
 152. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (allowing a state to 
disenfranchise convicted felons); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 
53–54 (1959) (allowing a state to disenfranchise individuals who fail a literacy test). 
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remain intact. In this sense, the fundamental right to vote is unusual. 
This Part argues that an affirmative right to an adequate education153 
is essential to preserving an intact right to vote. Furthermore, because 
a state’s right to deny the franchise based on a literacy test or device 
has been stripped by federal statute,154 the only remaining option is 
for states to provide an education adequate to allow voters to exercise 
their franchise effectively. 
The idea of an essential link between education and voting is 
hardly a new one. President James Madison argued that “a people 
who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the 
power which knowledge gives.”155 Senator Horace Mann, whom 
Justice Frankfurter credited as one of the fathers of the modern, 
secular, public school,156 echoed Madison’s sentiment: “[I]t seems 
clear that the minimum of this education can never be less than such 
as is sufficient to qualify each citizen for the civil and social duties he 
will be called to discharge;—such an education . . . is necessary for the 
voter in municipal affairs . . . .”157 Senator Mann designed the 
Massachusetts compulsory school system to match his understanding 
that “schooling was necessary to preserve republican institutions and 
to create a political community.”158 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself 
has acknowledged this necessary connection between education and 
democracy. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,159 the Court recognized, “as 
Thomas Jefferson pointed out early in our history, that some degree 
of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively 
and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve 
 
 153. An “adequate education” as used here is defined as an education which provides those 
skills necessary to the intelligent exercise of the franchise. Part V, infra, provides a methodology 
for determining which skills fit this criteria. 
 154. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa(a) (2000) (“No citizen shall be denied, 
because of his failure to comply with any test or device, the right to vote in any Federal, State, 
or local election conducted in any State or political subdivision of a State.”). 
 155. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in THE COMPLETE 
MADISON 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953). 
 156. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 214–15 (1948) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring) (describing the birth of the secular public school and Horace Mann’s role in its 
inception). 
 157. HORACE MANN, THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE MANN ON THE 
EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 63 (Lawrence A. Cremin ed., Teachers Coll. Press 1957) (1846). 
 158. Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices 
of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 174 (1996). 
 159. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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freedom and independence.”160 And yet, the Court has never met its 
own mandate to ensure that this elusive “degree of education” is 
provided. 
The Rodriguez plaintiffs argued that “a voter cannot cast his 
ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes 
have been adequately developed.”161 The plaintiffs’ argument 
correctly rested on the notion that voting is not merely juggling levers 
in a booth, but rather involves making an intelligent connection 
between the votes cast and the voter’s goals in advancing a particular 
form of government. The American political system “was fashioned 
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people,”162 but if voters do 
not understand what they are voting for, they will be ill-equipped to 
engage in such interchange. Like all constitutional rights, the right to 
vote cannot be interpreted as a mere formality. Being allowed to cast 
a ballot is not enough; voters must be able to understand just what it 
is they are voting for. Accordingly, an adequate education is one that 
prepares the incipient voter to navigate effectively the ocean of 
magazines, newspapers, and television programs upon which all 
modern voters depend for information.163 
Ironically, some of the best judicial support for this view of the 
right to vote stems from a decision upholding the right of states to 
 
 160. Id. at 221. 
 161. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973). 
 162. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
 163. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 52 (1959) (arguing 
that the ability to understand “newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter” may 
be essential to exercising the franchise). A recent University of Maryland study highlights the 
crucial import of training voters to select from the cacophony of news sources. See STEVEN 
KULL ET AL., PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES, MISPERCEPTIONS, THE 
MEDIA AND THE IRAQ WAR 7, 12–20 (2003), http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/ 
Media_10_02_03_Report.pdf (2003). The Kull study asked respondents whether they believed 
in the veracity of three false statements: (1) “Evidence of links between Iraq and al-Qaeda have 
been found”; (2) “Weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq”; and (3) “World 
public opinion favored the US going to war with Iraq.” Id. at 7. Although only 23 percent of 
persons who were primarily informed by PBS or NPR believed one or more of the (incorrect) 
statements, 55 percent of CNN and NBC watchers were victims of misinformation, and 80 
percent of FOX News viewers were misinformed regarding the Iraq war. Id. at 13. These 
misperceptions had a strong correlation with respondents’ political preference. Although 
supporters of President Bush had a 45 percent chance of believing each of the false statements, 
supporters of the Democrats had only a 17 percent chance of believing each false statement. Id. 
at 18. This data suggests that some news sources better inform their consumers than others, and 
that those consumers must possess a baseline of knowledge to distinguish between good, bad 
and intentionally misleading journalism. 
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deny the franchise. In Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of 
Elections,164 the Supreme Court upheld a state law that required 
voters to pass a literacy test. In doing so, the Court held that because 
of the role that “newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed 
matter” play in educating voters, it was reasonable to conclude that 
“only those who [were] literate should exercise the franchise.”165 
Lassiter was overturned by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which 
forbids states from restricting the franchise on the basis of a literacy 
or other test,166 but that does not mean that Lassiter was a decision 
without any wisdom whatsoever. Literacy and similar skills are 
essential to meaningful exercise of the franchise, and a meaningful 
right to vote must encompass a meaningful right to education. 
In Reynolds v. Sims,167 the Supreme Court made the seemingly 
obvious point that “[i]t would appear extraordinary to suggest that a 
State could be constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that 
certain of the State’s voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their 
legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote 
only once.”168 Yet this vote inflation is effectively what states engage 
in by providing a superior education to some districts, while denying 
that opportunity to others. As poorly-educated voters are 
substantially less likely to vote than well-educated voters,169 denying 
an adequate education to some school districts while providing one to 
others ensures that certain voters will be constructively 
disenfranchised for no other reason than geography. Even worse, 
without an adequate education, those who do cast a ballot often will 
not understand just what they are voting for. 
V.  THE SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE 
EDUCATION 
So far, this Note has found little wisdom in Rodriguez, but 
Justice Powell’s majority opinion does make one fair critique of a 
fundamental right to an adequate education: “Even if it were 
conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a 
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of 
 
 164. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
 165. Id. at 52. 
 166. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa(a) (2000). 
 167. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 168. Id. at 562. 
 169. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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[preexisting constitutional rights], we have no indication that the 
present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an 
education that falls short.”170 It is not unreasonable for the Court to 
ask, “Why literacy and not golf?”171 Accordingly, if Rodriguez-style 
plaintiffs are to be successful at the federal level, they must be able to 
define just what skills are required to be taught under the 
Constitution. Fortunately, the fifty states have already made this 
determination. 
Justice Brandeis famously wrote that “[i]t is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if 
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”172 The 
purpose of this laboratory, however, is not to engage in a mindless 
exercise of federalism for its own sake, but instead to weigh various 
methods against one another as part of a quest for the ideal. The 
“laboratory of the states” is how American policymakers separate the 
wheat from the chaff, and when consensus emerges among the several 
states to scrap one policy in favor of another, such consensus should 
not be lightly ignored.173 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has 
correctly deferred to this consensus, acknowledging it three times in 
the last four terms. In striking down antisodomy laws in Lawrence v. 
Texas,174 the Court noted that “[o]ver the course of the last decades, 
States with same-sex prohibitions have moved toward abolishing 
them.”175 Similarly, in Atkins v. Virginia,176 the Court forbade 
executions of the mentally retarded largely because of the growing 
 
 170. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1973). 
 171. This question was originally posed as, “Why education and not golf?” in Professor 
Frank Michelman’s seminal article on the Constitution and the poor. Frank I. Michelman, The 
Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 59 (1969). 
 172. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 173. Professor Cass Sunstein argues that the very purpose of the Due Process Clause is to 
prevent radical actions by single states: 
From its inception, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted largely (though not 
exclusively) to protect traditional practices against short-run departures. The clause 
has therefore been associated with a particular conception of judicial review, one that 
sees the courts as safeguards against novel developments brought about by temporary 
majorities who are insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between 
Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988). 
 174. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 175. Id. at 570. 
 176. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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consensus among the states that such executions were intolerable.177 
The Court used the same reasoning to invalidate executions of 
juveniles just three years later.178 
A similar deference is called for in defining the scope of a 
constitutional right to an adequate education. Under the No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2001, each state receiving federal education grants 
must establish statewide standards179 and assessments180 for math, 
reading, and the language arts. Unsurprisingly, the states generally 
agree as to which skills should be included in these mandatory 
standards and assessments. When a particular skill is required by all 
fifty states, such consensus should be highly persuasive to a federal 
court that this skill is necessary to achieving an adequate education. 
Accordingly, the best starting point for determining the scope of a 
fundamental right to education is the states themselves. 
Providing even the most disadvantaged children with an 
adequate education is not only constitutionally mandated but also 
wholly attainable. Several models already exist that prove that any 
child can learn, given the right school environment.181 The lesson of 
 
 177. See id. at 315–16 (“[T]he large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally 
retarded persons . . . provides powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded 
offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”). 
 178. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1194 (2005) (“A majority of States have rejected 
the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is 
required by the Eighth Amendment.”). Admittedly, Roper and Atkins provide less support for 
the argument that the Court should seek guidance from the states in educational civil rights 
cases than does Lawrence because the Eighth Amendment has long been interpreted to 
consider “‘evolving standards of decency.’” Id. at 1190 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
100–01 (1985)). 
 179. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(C) (Supp. I 2001) (“The State shall have . . . academic 
standards for all public elementary school and secondary school children . . . [and such 
standards] shall include the . . . knowledge, skills, and levels of achievement expected of all 
children.”). 
 180. See id. § 6311(b)(2)(A) (“Each State plan shall demonstrate that the State has 
developed and is implementing a single, statewide State accountability system . . . .”). Statewide 
standards and assessments were common in many states long before No Child Left Behind 
became law. See Jennifer R. Rowe, High School Exit Exams Meet IDEA—An Examination of 
the History, Legal Ramifications, and Implications for Local School Administrators and 
Teachers, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 75, 89–95 (chronicling the history of high school exit exams 
from the 1970s to the present). 
 181. See Jaime Escalante & Jack Dirmann, The Jaime Escalante Math Program, 59 J. OF 
NEGRO EDUC. 407, 407–08 (1990) (explaining the success of the “Escalante Math Program,” 
which teaches calculus to nearly two hundred inner city students each year); Peter H. Gibbon, A 
Teacher’s Tough Model, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A23 (“[The teacher] . . . . moved to 
Hobart Elementary School in Los Angeles to teach students who lived in poor neighborhoods 
and knew little English. . . . His students read ‘The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn’ and The 
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these successful models, however, is that such achievement among 
disadvantaged students only comes through extra effort on the part of 
the school. It is not enough, as the Rodriguez plaintiffs did, to 
demand equality of resources to each district and expect all children 
to receive an adequate education. If the educational adequacy 
mandated by the Constitution is ever to become a reality, it will only 
be achieved by providing disadvantaged youth with additional 
resources, superior instruction, and above all additional instruction 
time. This is the model used by highly successful programs such as 
KIPP, the Escalante Math Program, and the Hobart 
Shakespearians,182 and it is the model states must adopt to meet their 
constitutional obligations to underprivileged youth. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Thurgood Marshall understood that educational civil 
rights can only be granted by an active judiciary. Years of right-wing 
appointments, however, have buried this understanding under a pile 
of “Impeach Earl Warren” bumper stickers. It would be naive to 
think that civil rights of any kind will experience a renaissance as long 
as conservative presidents continue to push the Court further to the 
right, but this does not mean that progressives should ignore their 
duty to provide an alternative vision of the law. When conservatives 
were dissatisfied with desegregation orders and other cases that 
expansively interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, they responded 
with a comprehensive vision for a right-wing Constitution—the very 
vision captured by the Reagan-era Guidelines.183 This narrow vision 
can be defeated, but it can only be defeated by demanding 
meaningful rights instead of empty formalism. 
 
Crucible. They play Vivaldi, perform King Lear and outperform other students on standardized 
tests.”); Lynn Rosellini, Getting Young Lives in Line, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 22, 2004, 
at 87 (“Most KIPP students are poor and enter with reading and math skills well below grade 
level. Yet the schools have consistently taken disadvantaged children and dramatically boosted 
their academic achievement.”). 
 182. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra notes 69–71 (describing the Guidelines’ view of equitable relief). 
